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Introduction
The military is required to manage its force posture based on resources, threats, and objectives defined by the National Security Strategy (NSS), National Defense Strategy (NDS) and National Military Strategy (NMS) . 1 This guidance should provide "strategic coherence, which would contribute to financial solvency, public consensus, and, ultimately, international stability…." 2 Cold War strategic coherence made "force planning…relatively straightforward." 3 Post-Cold War force planning has been much more difficult, because threats and objectives identified in the national security and military strategies have expanded in type and scope: "The United States no longer confronted a clear adversary (the Soviet Union) or a rival ideology (communism). These threats had disciplined American strategic thinking. They had also become comfortable loadstars. Suddenly removed, they left policymakers adrift."
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In the absence of post-cold war strategic consensus, the Air Force's downsizing efforts have struggled to find coherence with ever-growing missions directed by the NSS.
Instead of targeted downsizing to match missions, the Air Force maintains capabilities with fewer resources by making across-the-board reductions and consolidations in many AFSCs. These "peanut-butter spread" downsizing efforts have been repeated in multiple rounds of reductions from the early 1990s to the present.
Multiple rounds of downsizing and consolidation over two decades have diminished the Air Force's ability to operate core missions such as nuclear, logistics/maintenance, and personnel. As career fields were consolidated, experts and institutional memory were reduced, and the impact of downsizing programs was not effectively documented. The institutional memory of cumulative damage to career fields/AFSCs was unavailable to those implementing subsequent rounds of reductions.
Force structure follows military expenditures as associated with GDP. In contrast, the Air Force and Navy will be reduced from 2001.
Force at 16 active and 12 reserve tactical fighter wings, the Navy at 450 ships including 12 carriers, and the Marines at 3 active and 1 reserve division."
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In the context of these reductions, the services received little specific direction on "what relative weight different strategic themes" should be given and how "to balance planning for traditional contingencies with preparations for possible new problems (ranging from peacekeeping and limited intervention to dealing with proliferation of weapons of mass destruction." 18 This problem led to across-the-board reductions, versus targeted cuts to specific capabilities.
Result
The Base Force reductions (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) began a drastic personnel decline for the Air Force 19 . The Base Force Reductions spanned two presidencies (Bush/Clinton), and overlapped the Bottom Up Review (BUR) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) ; the aggregate results will be discussed after the review of President Clinton's reduction efforts.
NSS/NMS Review under President William Jefferson Clinton January 20, 1993 -January 20, 2001
President Clinton's administration published a NSS in seven of eight years ( , 1996 ( , 1998 ( , 2000 ( ) and a NMS in 1995 Clinton's strategic focus changed from regional defense to enlargement: "Throughout the Cold War we contained a global threat to market democracies; now we should seek to enlarge their reach, particularly in places of special significance to us. The successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement-enlargement of the world's free community of market democracies. '' 21 The difference between Regional Defense and Enlargement was significant and created further uncertainty. While there was some regional focus--the need to win two simultaneous major theater conflicts--enlarging the world's community of democracies became paramount. 
Result
For the period of the Base Force Reductions (1994 Reductions ( -1995 , the BUR (1993 BUR ( -1999 During the Bush and Clinton reduction years, the 36XX community went through four consolidations ( Figure 3 ).
The union of these functional areas would result in a career field responsible for: The Air Force downsizing did not entail a combination strategy. The Air Force reduced personnel and consolidated mission sets without reducing the work to be accomplished by, in this case, the 36XX officers. As a result, the initial round of reductions in the 1990s was the start of the slippery slope which in the end would decrease functional capability. Clinton's Enlargement strategy was replaced by a strategy to "Protect the Homeland" and capabilities based planning, which focuses more on how an adversary might fight than who or where an adversary might be. 41 The requirement to fight and win 2 MTCs was replaced with the 1-4-2-1 concept. 
NSS/NMS Review under President

Force Reduction Program
The 2001 QDR directed very little change to the overall force structure numbers for the Armed Forces. As Cordesman and Frederiksen noted, the QDR "offered scant direction on how the services might prevent or respond to so-called fourth-generation warfare attacks like the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 . Moreover, it did little to describe major changes in US force structures." 45 The 2006 QDR through Presidential Budgeting Directive (PBD)-720
"outlined the USAF's plans to reduce the total active force by approximately 40,000 personnel as a means of financing aircraft recapitalization and modernization programs." 46 As a result, "In 2007, the USAF undertook a reduction-in-force. Because of budget constraints, the USAF planned to reduce the service's size from 360,000 active duty personnel to 316,000." 47 The size of the active-duty USAF in 2007 was roughly 64% of that in 1991. 48 However, the reduction was ended at approximately 330,000 [later defined to be 326,000] personnel in 2008. 49 While the Army and Marine force continued to grow, and the Navy remained flat, the Air Force continued to downsize despite the fact that the new 1-4-2-1 strategy would be more reliant on airpower--a continuing disconnect between strategy and resource allocation.
Result
With continued reductions in USAF personnel despite increasing responsibilities, 
Observations
General Strategic Observations
• Frequent, expansive changes in guiding strategic documents do not provide adequate guidance for resource allocation and expectations for the armed forces. Similarly, these documents do not match the expanding nature of strategic expectations on the military with the manpower resource requirements of services who will be the primary executor of these growing missions. With the shift to Asia and the associated humanitarian and expeditionary nature of missions, Naval and Air assets will increasingly be needed; yet both services will be reduced to their lowest level.
• There must be a more comprehensive and direct look at objectives, threats and the capabilities needed by the elements of national power -specifically the military. The strategy should not change annually, and it should provide succinct strategic direction.
There must be a clearly defined linkage between objectives, capabilities needed, and resources required to meet the strategic focus. The executive and legislative branches should clearly understand the ramifications of diminished resources to the Armed Forces structure when inversely proportional to the overall increase in strategic mission. Based on the review of the two decades and the continued actions by the Air Force, it is apprarent that despite changes in executives and strategies, the Air Force does not have the ability to stem the tide of reductions. Damage to career fields has been done. The question remains how to stop the slide.
• Consolidation was intended to safeguard capacity in functional communities in the early rounds of reductions because there was no clear focused direction or objective for specific forces contained within the strategic documents of the executive. Cost sharing reductions across all AFSCs was initially seen as safer to maintain capacity, because the national strategies, which should provide focused direction, did not. Two decades of downsizing, reductions, and consolidation destroyed capabilty versus preserving it. The services can not cope with working longer hours, doing more work with less and thinning out the rest of the force's expertise.
• Consolidation as a tactic to meet across the board reductions is not reserved just for functional communities. Bases are also subject to this tactic. BRAC and joint basing, tactics used by DoD to consolidate service resources in close proximity, was accomplished to save dollars in the fiscally constrained environment. Like the problems in the functional consolidations, both have had equal problems-the first because the BRAC bases are seldom really closed and the second because it has proven costly.
Air Force and Functional Observations
• Downsizing strategies did not place a significant focus on divesting work while consolidating in response to the reductions. Most efforts focused on strictly matching the number of personnel reductions to the dollars needed. This concept does not follow business practices for successful downsizing actions which incorporates reductions with divesting of work. The dictate, "do more with less," drives inefficiencies. In many cases the work is done and/or monitored by the new functional and a portion of the work is pushed to the AF community at large as a second and third order effect. Those functional communities, who were never the experts or assigned those responsibilites, now help bear the cost of the reduced capability of the owning functional area. This has and will continue to have detrimental effects as the reductions continue. As an example, commanders and their Airmen are responsible for being administration, personnel, finance, communciations/computer efficient because the expertise in their units or base has been reduced, eliminated or consolidated. This impacts the time and resources these secondary AFSCs have to accomplish their own functional area work. In essence, while these communities have not been thinned out via their own functional consolidation, they are being thinned out as an ancillary effect of other consolidations. This impacts their own expertise and concentration on their mission.
• Officer development in consolidated career fields has been hampered. The once universal concept for officer development in a functional category was to concentrate on learning the details of the function (deep) and then, over the course of a career, generally as one became a field grade officer or senior CGO, development would turn to learning more about the Air Force and different functions and their operation (broad). While this still occurs in many functionals that have a singular mission set (Security Forces, Operations, Maintenance), those support functions that have been merged/consolidated over the years and now encompass many functional disciplines, the development is no longer deep to broad it is broad only. For these career fields and officers, their expertise of their own functional community is very shallow.
• 38MX was the organizational experts for all force structure change programs, organizational design and analysis as discussed in this paper. With the consolidation, the Air Force destroyed this competency by merging with 36PX (personnel) and 34MX (Services). With the dilution of career fields, the Air Force has removed the experts who conducted and advised change management activities in a time of diminished resources when those disciplines are needed most.
Opportunities for Additional Research
The research opened by this paper is just the tip of the problem. The results for the original 36XX and now 38PX career field as a byproduct of the downsizing tactic taken by the Air Force and the observations regarding the strategies employed by the executive can be extrapolated to almost every functional community in the Air Force and expanded to other services. It is critical now to review what really has been done to the military. Consolidation, doing more with less, and continually thinning out the career fields because there is no concentrated focus area to strategically reduce is not the answer, and in many cases, the damage may be irreversable unless a significant influx of resources occurs (which won't happen as we continually downsize and dollars are even more scarce) or the government changes coping mechanisms. These are the areas that require additional research.
• Issue: Other functional issues (Logistics, Finance, Contracting, Communications/computers, Nuclear enterprise, etc ) similar to those represented in this 
Recommendations
The Air Force has been downsizing for two decades in a context of increasing mission demands and diminishing resources. Increasing mission demands prevent the Air Force from making cuts in line with best practices such as workforce reduction and work redesign (elimination of work). Instead, the Air Force has attempted to do more with less, consolidating functions for its officers while keeping all the functional requirements. As a result, the Air Force has eliminated the experts it needs to conduct its change programs, organizational design, and manning.
In order to stop the Air Force's slide, two recommendations need to be considered. First, the executive and legislative branches must provide clear and direct strategic guidance to DoD; expanding, vague strategic focus combined with legislative reduction in resources to meet these missions does not allow DoD to accurately determine what forces are needed and to prioritize missions. As a result of this inconsistency in mission versus resources, DoD spreads the reductions across all career fields to ensure capacity. After two decades of this tactic, capacity has been diminished as career fields have been thinned and consolidated.
Next, if resources continue to diminish with expanding strategic focus, DoD and the Air Force should consider implementing a Revolution in Military SUPPORT Activities (RMSA).
Should DoD keep clubs, auto hobby shops, fitness centers, golf courses etc. when the civilian sector offers the competition and at lower cost and better facilities? Is it necessary for DoD to have four separate finance, personnel, computer, civil engineering, contracting activities or so many diverse and separate PME institutions, Academies etc. in this era of joint operations and diminished resources? Arguments about service culture, unique missions, and practices are frequently cited as reasons not to purple or singularize support activities, and past attempts to purple some (Defense Integrated Human Resource Management System (DIHRMS) have failed horribly. Nevertheless, as strategic responsibilities will likely continue to expand while resources diminish, a RMSA will need to closely examine these issues.
Conclusion
This paper has documented the detrimental cumulative effects of multiple rounds of downsizing in an era of expanding strategic scope and declining resources. In part due to insufficient documentation of downsizing's effects, USAF has consistently overestimated the potential benefits of cutting current forces, and has not demonstrated a consistent capacity to estimate the level of future capabilities it can afford through cutting current forces. Doing more, keeping the same capabilities while downsizing, and thinning career fields through consolidation might have worked for the initial reductions, but after two decades, this technique has hollowed various career fields, removed expertise and pushed the workload onto other functional communities that have also been hit with reductions. We may be past the point of correction without substantial additional resources or a significant change in operations and organizational culture. Adding another mission area for forces that are already thinned, without clear strategic prioritization and adequate resourcing will further exacerbate the problems. 1. NSS for a new century -first NSS of second term 2. Still advocated the same basic 3 -nuclear proliferation concern is also still present 3. International community is often reluctant to act forcefully without US leadership 1. In addition -foster peaceful, undivided, democratic Europe 2. Look across the Atlantic for economic partnership 3. America must prosper in the global economy 4. America must continue to be unrelenting force for peace 5. Must move strongly to counter growing dangers to security 6. Must have diplomatic and military tools to meet all challenges 1. Similar to previous NSS in terms of threats 2. Also states -Not only must the US military be prepared to successfully conduct multiple concurrent operations world-wide, it must also be prepared to do so in the face of challenges such as terrorism, information operations, and threats of WMD 3. Acting alone if need be but preference is for multilateral action 4. High end is fighting and winning major theater wars 5. Able to deter credibly and defeat large-scale, cross border aggression in two distinct theaters in overlapping time frames
1. Continue aggressive efforts to construct appropriate 21st century national security programs and structures 2. QDR is doing this within the DoD 3. Modernization is approaching quickly and must be done 4. R&D investment is needed 1. Similar in scope and direction 2. Interesting -says the challenges are increasing yet QDR directs reduction 3. The budget seems to have won out over challenges 1996 Bill Clinton YES Same or almost the exact same as the NSS from 1994 and 1995 -update to the specifics that occurred in the year, revised how and when military forces will be used Similar to previous Clinton NSS statements 1. Revised how/when US will engage 2. Vital American interests -survival, security, and vitality of our national entity -defense of US territory, citizens, allies, economic well being 3. Not vital US interests -affect importantly our national wellbeing but only carefully and if they advance US interests 4. Humanitarian interests 11," 2009 . Complete quote and thought, "They were difficult to think about in systematic terms, ranging from rogue states to anarchical societies, with warlords and terrorists in-between…. How would the United States integrate military capabilities into plans for enlargement? Under which conditions would the nation send U.S. forces abroad? Which threats would leaders emphasize in military procurement and planning? These were all central topics of debate during the Cold War. These issues dropped off the map of policy-and academic study-in the post-Cold War world."
5 The strategic documents from the 1990s through 2012 provide the foundational direction for reduction actions (Appendices 1-7 are summaries of NSS, NDS and NMS documents from 1991 until 2012).
6. Gargan, To Defend a Nation: An Overview of Downsizing and the U.S. Military, 1999 . "Articulation of military strategies which, in turn, demarcate the size of force needed, requires some level of consensus on the priority status of values and interests to be protected and promoted during a given period. The military strategies and resulting force size must also consider the likelihood and severity of the nature and scope of threats during the period. Since resources are always limited and potential points of trouble are global, military forces must be tasked to deal only with significant problems." 7. Snider, "The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision," 1995. 8. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 Act of , 1986 2) The foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities of the United States necessary to deter aggression and to implement the national security strategy of the United States. (3) The proposed short-term and long-term uses of the political, economic, military, and other elements of the national power of the United States to protect or promote the interests and achieve the goals and objectives referred to in paragraph (1). (4) The adequacy of the capabilities of the United States to carry out the national security strategy of the United States, including an evaluation of the balance among the capabilities of all elements of the national power of the United States to support the implementation of the national security strategy. (5) Such other information as may be necessary to help inform Congress 9. Title 10-Armed Forces, n.d., as defined by 10 U.S.C., Section 153. Title 10, the NMS will: "(B) A description of the strategic environment and the opportunities and challenges that affect United States national interests and United States national security. (C) A description of the regional threats to United States national interests and United States national security. (D) A description of the international threats posed by terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and asymmetric challenges to United States national security. (E) Identification of United States national military objectives and the relationship of those objectives to the strategic environment,
